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Abstract 
 
 We show the existence of involuntary unemployment without assuming wage rigidity. A 
key point of our analysis is indivisibility of labor supply. We derive involuntary 
unemployment by considering utility maximization of consumers and profit maximization 
of firms in an overlapping generations model under monopolistic competition with 
indivisibility of labor supply. 
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1  Introduction 
 
 Umada (1997) derived an upward-sloping labor demand curve from mark-up principle for 
firms, and argued that such an upward-sloping labor demand curve leads to the existence of 
involuntary unemployment without wage rigidity1. But his model of firms’ behavior is ad-
hoc. In this paper we consider utility maximization of consumers and profit maximization of 
firms in an overlapping generations model under monopolistic competition according to 
Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011 and 2015) and show the existence of involuntary unemployment 
without assuming wage rigidity. A key point of our analysis is indivisibility of labor supply. 
As discussed by Otaki (2015) (Theorem 2.3) and Otaki (2012), if labor supply is divisible 
and it can be small, there exists no unemployment. In the next section we analyze the relation 
between indivisibility of labor supply and the existence of involuntary unemployment. We 
show that because the real wage rate and the rservation real wage rate for individuals are 
contanst given the expected inflation rate, when the real wage rate is larger than the 
reservation real wage rate, there exists no mechanism to reduce the difference between them. 
In Section 3 we present a general analysis of divisibility and indivisibility of labor supply. In 
Appendix A.1 and A.2 we present details of calculations. 
 
1
 Lavoie (2001) presented a similar analysis. 
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2  Indivisible labor supply and involuntary unemployment 
 
 We consider a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations model under 
monopolistic competition according to Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011 and 2015). There is one 
factor of production, labor, and there is a continuum of goods indexed by 𝑧𝑧 ∈ [0,1]. Each 
good is monopolistically produced by Firm 𝑧𝑧. Consumers are born at continuous density 
[0,1] × [0,1] in each period. They can supply only one unit of labor when they are young 
(the first period). 
 
2.1  Consumers 
 
 We use the following notations.  
  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧𝑧 at period 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧): the price of good 𝑧𝑧 at period 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = �∫10 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−1𝜂𝜂 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, 𝜂𝜂 > 1.   𝛽𝛽: disutility of labor, 𝛽𝛽 > 0. 
0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1. 𝑊𝑊: nominal wage rate. Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer. 𝐿𝐿: employment of each firm and the total employment. 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓: population of labor or employment at the full-employment state. 𝑦𝑦: labor productivity, 𝑦𝑦 ≥ 1. 
 
  𝛿𝛿 is the definition function. If a consumer is employed, 𝛿𝛿 = 1; if he is not employed, 𝛿𝛿 =
0. The labor productivity is 𝑦𝑦. 𝑦𝑦 unit of the goods is produced by one unit of labor. The 
utility of consumers of one generation over two periods is  
 𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋1, 𝑋𝑋2, 𝛿𝛿, 𝛽𝛽) = �𝑋𝑋1�
𝛼𝛼
�𝑋𝑋2�
1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽. 
The budget constraint is  
 ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π. 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧) is the expectation of the price of good 𝑧𝑧 at period 2. The Lagrange function is  
 ℒ = (𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽 − 𝜆𝜆 �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 − 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 − Π�. 𝜆𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions are  
 𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 1𝜂𝜂1−1𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧), (1) 
 and  
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 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)−𝛼𝛼 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 1𝜂𝜂1−1𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧). (2) 
 They are rewritten as  
 𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧), (3) 
  
 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧). (4) 
 Let  
 𝑃𝑃1 = �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 , 𝑃𝑃2 = �∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂. 
They are price indices. By some calculations we obtain (please see Appendix A.1)  
 
(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜆𝜆 �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 𝜆𝜆(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π). (5) 
 Also we get (please see Appendix A.2)  
 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π, (6) 
  
 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 = ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π), (7) 
 and  
 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π). (8) 
 The indirect utility of consumers is written as  
       𝑉𝑉 = (𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
(𝑃𝑃1)𝛼𝛼 (1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼(𝑃𝑃2)1−𝛼𝛼 (𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π) − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽,          (9) 
with  
 𝜆𝜆 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
(𝑃𝑃1)𝛼𝛼 (1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼(𝑃𝑃2)1−𝛼𝛼 . 
The reservation nominal wage 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 is a solution of the following equation.  
 𝜆𝜆(𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 + Π) − 𝛽𝛽 = 𝜆𝜆Π. 
From this  
 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = �𝑃𝑃1�𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 �𝑃𝑃2�1−𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽. 
Labor supply is indivisible. If 𝑊𝑊 > 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, the total labor supply is 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. If 𝑊𝑊 < 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, it is zero. 
If 𝑊𝑊 = 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, employment and unemployment are indifferent for consumers, and there exists 
no involuntary unemployment even if 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. Indivisibility of labor supply may be due to 
the fact that there exists minimum standard of living even in the advanced economy (please 
see Otaki (2012)). 
 Let 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1. This is the expected inflation rate (plus one). The reservation real wage rate is  
 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 = 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃1 = 1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼 �𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1�1−𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽 = 1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼 𝜌𝜌1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽. 
If the value of 𝜌𝜌 is given, 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 is constant.  
 
2.2  Firms 
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 From (3) and (5),  
 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π) �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
From (7),  
 
(𝑋𝑋1)1𝜂𝜂−1 = �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 = �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊+Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂−1. 
Therefore,  
 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π) �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊+Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊+Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂 𝑃𝑃1𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Thus,  
 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1𝜂𝜂 = �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊+Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂 𝑃𝑃1(𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧))−1. 
Hence,  
 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊+Π)𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂 . 
This is demand for good 𝑧𝑧 of an individual of younger generation. The total demand for 
good 𝑧𝑧 is  
 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂. 𝑌𝑌 is the effective demand defined by  
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + Π) + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. 𝐺𝐺 is the government expenditure and 𝑀𝑀 is consumption by the old generation of good 𝑧𝑧 
(about this demand function please see Otaki(2007, 2009)). The total employment, the total 
profits, the total government expenditure and the total consumption by the old generation are  
 ∫10 𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝐿𝐿, ∫10 Π𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = Π, ∫10 𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝐺𝐺, ∫10 𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝑀𝑀. 
We have  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = −𝜂𝜂 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃1 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)−1−𝜂𝜂(𝑃𝑃1)−𝜂𝜂 = −𝜂𝜂 𝜕𝜕(𝑧𝑧)𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
The profit of Firm 𝑧𝑧 is  
 𝜋𝜋(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧). 𝑃𝑃1 is given for Firm 𝑧𝑧. The condition for profit maximization with respect to 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) is  
 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) + �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦� 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 0. 
This is rewritten as  
 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦 − 1𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦 + 1𝜂𝜂 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Therefore, we obtain  
 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊�1−1𝜂𝜂�𝑦𝑦 
 
2.3  Involuntary unemployment 
 
- 5 - 
 
 Since the model is symmetric, the prices of all goods are equal. Then,  
 𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Hence  
 𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑊𝑊�1−1𝜂𝜂�𝑦𝑦. 
 The real wage rate is  
 𝜔𝜔 = 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃1 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� 𝑦𝑦. (9) 
 This is constant, and depends on only the parameter of the utility function and the labor 
productivity. 
 The aggregate supply of the goods is equal to  
 𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + Π = 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦. 
The aggregate demand is  
 𝛼𝛼(𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + Π) + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦 + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. 
Since they are equal,  
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦 + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀, 
or  
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦 = 𝐺𝐺+𝑀𝑀1−𝛼𝛼 . 
In real terms2  
 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦 = 11−𝛼𝛼 (𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚), 
or 
 
 𝐿𝐿 = 1
(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦 (𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚), (11) 
where  
 𝑔𝑔 = 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1. 
(11) means that the employment 𝐿𝐿 is determined by 𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚. It can not be larger than 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. 
However, it may be strictly smaller than 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 (that is, 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓). Then, there exists involuntary 
umemployment. Since both the real wage rate 𝜔𝜔 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� 𝑦𝑦 and the reservation real wage 
rate 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅  are constant, if 𝜔𝜔 > 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅  there exists no mechanism to reduce the difference 
between them. 
 
Summary of discussions 
 
1. The real aggregate demand and the employment are determined by the real value of 𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚. The employment may be smaller than the population of labor, then there 
exists involuntary unemployment.  
2. The real wage rate and the reservation real wage rate are constant, and if the real wage 
rate is larger than the reservation real wage rate, there exists no mechanism to reduce 
the difference between them. 
 
2
 
11−𝛼𝛼 is a multiplier. 
- 6 - 
 
 
Comment on the nominal wage rate 
 
In the model of this section no mechanism determines the nominal wage rate. When the 
nominal value of 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 increases, the nominal aggregate demand and supply increase. If 
the nominal wage rate rises, the price also rises. If the rate of an increase in the nominal 
wage rate is smaller than the rate of an increase in 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀, the real aggregate supply and 
the employment increases. Partition of the effects by an increase in 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 into a rise in 
the nominal wage rate (and the price) and an increase in the employment may be 
determined by bargaining between labor and firm3. 
 
3  Divisibility and indivisibility of labor supply 
 
 The utility of the representative consumer is  
 𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, 𝑙𝑙) = (𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝐺𝐺(𝑙𝑙), 
with the budget constraint  
 ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙 + Π. 𝑙𝑙 is labor supply of an individual (0 < 𝑙𝑙 ≤ 1), and 𝐺𝐺(𝑙𝑙) is a function of disutility of labor 
which is strictly increasing, differentiable and strictly convex. Similarly to (9), we obtain the 
following indirect utility given 𝑙𝑙,  
 𝑉𝑉 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
(𝑃𝑃1)𝛼𝛼 (1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼(𝑃𝑃2)1−𝛼𝛼 (𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙 + Π) − 𝐺𝐺(𝑙𝑙). (12) 
Maximization of 𝑉𝑉 with respect to 𝑙𝑙 implies  
 
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
(𝑃𝑃1)𝛼𝛼 (1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼(𝑃𝑃2)1−𝛼𝛼 𝑊𝑊 = 𝐺𝐺′(𝑙𝑙). (13) 
Let 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1. (13) is rewritten as  
 
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌1−𝛼𝛼 𝜔𝜔 = 𝐺𝐺′(𝑙𝑙). (14) 𝜔𝜔 = 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃1 is the real wage rate. If the inflation rate (plus one) 𝜌𝜌 is given, 𝑙𝑙 is obtained from 
(14) as a function of 𝜔𝜔. 𝑙𝑙 is increasing in 𝜔𝜔 because 𝐺𝐺′′ > 0. In our model, however, from 
(9) 𝜔𝜔 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� 𝑦𝑦. Thus, we have  
 
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌1−𝛼𝛼 �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� 𝑦𝑦 = 𝐺𝐺′(𝑙𝑙). (15) 
The value of 𝑙𝑙 is obtained from (15). It does not depend on the nominal wage rate 𝑊𝑊 given 𝜌𝜌. The total labor supply is 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙. It is constant. 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 is the population of labor. If 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 is not 
larger than the labor demand, there exists no unemployment, that is, full-employment is 
realized. Then, the aggregate supply of the goods is  
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦. 
The aggregate demand is  
 
3
 Otaki (2009) has shown the existence of involuntary unemployment using efficient wage bargaining according to McDonald and 
Solow (1981). The arguments of this paper, however, do not depend on bargaining. 
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 𝛼𝛼�𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 + Π� + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. 
Since they are equal,  
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. 
This means  
 𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐺𝐺+𝑀𝑀
(1−𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦. 
Because 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 is constant, the price 𝑃𝑃1 is determined by 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. Then, the nominal wage is 
set by 𝑊𝑊 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� 𝑦𝑦𝑃𝑃1. In real terms  
 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 = 𝑔𝑔+𝑚𝑚(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦, (16) 
where  
 𝑔𝑔 = 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1. 
(16) is an identity not an equation. Thus, we should write it as follows.  
 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 ≡ 𝑔𝑔+𝑚𝑚(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦. 
On the other hand, (11) in the previous section is an equation not an identity. 
 If  
 
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝜌𝜌1−𝛼𝛼 �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� 𝑦𝑦 ≥ 𝐺𝐺′(𝑙𝑙), for  0 < 𝑙𝑙 ≤ 1  , 
consumers choose 𝑙𝑙 = 1, and then the labor supply is indivisible. 
 
4  Concluding Remark 
 
 In this paper we have examined the existence of involuntary umemployment using a 
monopolistic competition model. We have derived involuntary unemployment from 
indivisibility of labor supply. We think that although the labor supply must not be infinitely 
divisible, it need not be infinitely indivisible. We assume that the productivity of labor is 
constant. We want to study the problem of involuntary unemployment under indivisibility of 
labor supply when the goods are produced under an increasing returns to scale technology. 
 
Appendices 
 
 
A.1 Derivation of (5) 
 
From (3) and (4)  
 𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 ∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 
 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜆𝜆 ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧, 
  
 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 ∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 
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 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜆𝜆 ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧. 
 They mean  
 
∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼, 
and  
 
(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜆𝜆 �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 𝜆𝜆(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π). 
 
 
A.2 Derivations of (6), (7) and (8) 
 
From (1) and (2), we have  
 
[𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼]1−𝜂𝜂 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂 , 
and  
 
[(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)−𝛼𝛼]1−𝜂𝜂 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂. 
They mean  
 
[𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼−1(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼]1−𝜂𝜂 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 ∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂 ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧, 
and  
[(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)−𝛼𝛼]1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂�10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧. 
Then, we obtain  
 𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜆𝜆 �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 𝑋𝑋1 = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1, 
and  
 (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜆𝜆 �∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 𝑋𝑋2 = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2. 
From them we get  
 
𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼, 
 
 
(𝑋𝑋1)𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋2)1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜆𝜆(𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2), 
 
 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π, 
  
 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 = ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π), 
 and  
 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π). 
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